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RE-MUTUALIZING THE MUTUAL FUND
INDUSTRY THE ALPHA AND THE OMEGA
JOHN C. BOGLE *
Abstract: The mutual fund industry began in 1924 with the formation of
a truly mutual mutual fund: one organized, operated, and managed, not
by a separate management. company with its own commercial interests,
but by its own trustees; compensated not on the basis of the trust's
principal, but, under traditional fiduciary standards, its income. This
model of the mutual fund (the Alpha model) has been replaced by the
mutual fund complex of 2004 (the Omega model). Although most
mutual funds utilize this model, this Essay argues it is contrary to the
intent and language of the Investment Company Act of 1940 as it benefits
managers and directors as opposed to shareholders. This Essay compares
the actual benefit to shareholders from funds utilizing the Omega model
versus those using the Alpha model and proposes it is time to return to
the Alpha model of 1924.
INTRODUCTION
March 21, 2004 marked the eightieth anniversary of America's first.
mutual fund. Organized in Boston, the Massachusetts Investors Trust
("MIT" or the "Trust") was a Massachusetts trust managed by its own
trustees, who held the power "in their uncontrolled discretion" to invest
its assets.' The trustees "were to be compensated at the current Boston
rate for trustees," 6% of the investment income earned by the trust. 2
The mutual fund industry began, then, with the formation of a
truly mutual mutual fund: one organized, operated, and managed, not
by a separate management company with its own commercial interests,
© 2004 John C. Bogle. President of the Bogle Financial Markets Research Center;
Founder and former Chairman, The Vanguard Group, Inc. This Essay is based on a lecture
the author delivered at Boston College Law School on January 21, 2004. The opinions
expressed herein do not necessarily represent the views of Vanguard's present manage-
ment. The Boston College Law Review has relied on the Bogle Financial Markets Research
Center to compile the financial data presented in this Essay using the identified sources.
Big Money in Boston. FoRntxr, Dec. 1949, at 116, 118-19 {quote appears in caption to
picture entitled "Boston Trustee, 1950 Model").
2
 SEC, INvEsTmENT MUS - IN AND INVFSIIIENT Comenruts (pt. 1) 102 (.1939) (internal
quotation omitted).
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but by its own trustees; compensated not on the basis of the trust's
principal, but, under traditional fiduciary standards, its income.
We use the word "Alpha" to describe the first event in a series, and
the word 'Omega" to describe the last event, the end of the series, or its
final development. To state what must be obvious, however, MIT's Al-
pha was followed by the development of a very different mode of fund
organization. Today, the industry's almost universal modus operandi is
not individual funds but fund complexes, they are managed not by their
own trustees but by external corporations; they encompass not only
investment management but also administration, operations, distribu-
tion, and marketing. The 1924 Alpha mutual fund, then, has been re-
placed by the 2004 Omega mutual fund complex—a term that, all those
years ago, would have seemed somehow jarring or inappropriate.
But "the national public interest and the interest of investors"5—
the focus of our industry's guiding statute, the Investment Company
Act of 19404 (the "1940 Act" or "Investment Company Act")—pre-
chides our acceptance of today's almost universally accepted industry
structure—today's Omega model—as the end of mutual fund devel-
opment. Why? Because the reality is that this structure has been
shaped, increasingly and almost unremittingly, to serve the interest of
fund managers, a disservice to the public interest and the interest of
fund shareholders.
Sharply rising fund costs have widened the shortfall by which fund
returns have lagged the returns earned itt the financial markets; the
age-old wisdom of long-term investing has been importantly crowded
out by the folly of short-term speculation; and "product marketing" has
sttperceded investment management as our highest value. The recent
fund scandals provide tangible evidence of the triumph of managers'
capitalism over owners' capitalism in mutual fund America, an un-
happy parallel to what we have observed in corporate America itself.
These developments are indisputable, and they fly in the face of
the very language of the Investment Company Act—mutual funds
must be "organized, operated, [and] managed" 5 in the interests of
their shareowners rather than in the interests of their "investment ad-
visers ... [and] underwriters"6—a policy now honored more in the
breach than in the observance. It is high time for a new Omega, an
3 Investment Company Act of 1940 § 1 (b), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-1(b) (2000).
Investment Company Act of 1940 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 80a).
6 Id. § 1 (b) (2), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-I (b) (2).
6 Id.
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industry structure that would, paradoxically enough, parallel the Al-
pha structure under which MIT was created eighty years ago.
I. THE DEVELOPMENT OF MIT
A. Remarkable Initial Success
Almost from its inception, MIT was a remarkable success. Al-
though in its first few years the going was slow, assets had soared to
$3.3 million by die end of 1926. As the boom of the late 1920s con-
tinued, MIT flourished. It earned a return of 88% for its investors in
1926-1928, only to lose 63% of their capital in the bust that followed
in 1929-1932. But as the market recovered, its assets grew apace—to
$128 million by 1936 and to $277 million by 1949, the largest stock
fund in the industry throughout that entire period. MIT would main-
tain that rank until 1975, when its assets reached a total of $1.15 bil-
lion—a truly amazing half-century of preeminence.
To its enviable status as both the oldest and largest mutual fund,
MIT added the luster of consistently ranking as the lowest-cost fund.
Its trustees soon reduced that original 6% fee to 5% of income and
then, in 1949, to 3.5%. Measuring its costs as a percentage of fund
assets (now the conventional way we report expenses), the Trust's ex-
pense ratio fell from 0.50% in the early years to 0.39% in 1949, to a
fairly steady 0.19% during 1960-1969. During that entire period MIT
was offered publicly through stock brokers by an underwriter origi-
nally named Learoyd-Foster, later to become Vance, Sanders & Co.
Managed by its own trustees and unaffiliated with its distributor, the
truly mutual structure of the Trust played a major role in its sustained
leadership of the industry.
As 1969 began, then, MIT was an industry maverick. It stood for
trusteeship and did not engage in salesmanship. It kept its costs at.
rock-bottom levels. Its portfolio was broadly diversified and had little
turnover. It invested for the long term and so did the shareholders
who purchased its shares. Virtually every other fund in the industry
operated under the conventional structure with an external "man-
agement company" that asstuned full responsibility for its operations,
investment advice, and share distribution in return for an asset-
related—not income-related—fee paid by existing investors and a share
of the sales loads paid by new investors. Yet MIT held to its own high
standards and prospered—a success story, in its own way, for the idea
that mutuality worked.
Changing from Alpha to Omega:
The MIT Experience
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B. From Alpha to Omega
During 1969, however, the structure changed. The trustees solic-
ited proxies from the shareholders of MIT (and its sister fund, Massa-
chusetts Investors Growth Stock Fund—originally named "Massachu-
setts Investors Second Fund") for approval to "demutualize" and adopt.
the conventional external management structure. When the share-
holders approved the proposal, the Trust became a member of a fund
family that adopted the name "Massachusetts Financial Services"
("MFS"). If MIT was a fund that had stood for something unique for
nearly a half century, in 1969 it became one of the crowd.
Was that change from Alpha to Omega good or bad? We can say
unequivocally that, in terms of the fees it generated for its managers,
it was good. We can also say unequivocally that, in terms of the costs
borne by its shareholders, it was bad. That 0.19% expense ratio in
1968 doubled to 0.39% in 1976, and doubled again to 0.75% in 1994,
continuing to rise to 0.97% in 1998 and to 1.20% in 2003.
Figure 1 7
7
 Sources: Wiesenberger (1943-1992) and Lipper's LANA database ("Lipper") (1993-
2003). From 1993 on, reported expense ratios represent the asset-weighted average of all
MIT share classes.
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And that old limit of 3.5% of income the trustees put into place in
1949? It was long gone. In 2002, in fact, MIT's expenses consumed
precisely 80.4% of the trust's income.
But these ratios greatly understate the increase in the Trust's
costs. For even as its assets were growing, so were its fee rates, resulting
in enormous increases in the dollar amounts of fees paid. With assets
of $2.1 billion in 1969, MIT's management fees (including some rela-
tively small operating expenses) totaled $4.4 million.
Figure 28
Even a decade later in 1979, although the Trust's assets had declined by
50% to $1.1 billion after the 1973-1974 market crash and the troubled
times faced by the fund industry, fees had actually risen to $5.2 million.
In 1989, with assets at. $1.4 billion, fees continued to rise to $6.3 mil-
lion. And in 1999, when assets soared to $15.6 billion, fees totaled $158
million. While the Trust's assets had grown seven fold since MIT demu-
tualized in 1969, its fees had increased thirty-six times over. 9
8 Sources: Wiesenberger (1969-1989) and Lipper (1999. 2003).
9
 Assets slumped to $6.5 billion in 2003, with fees totaling nearly $80 million.
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C. NIIT's Long-Term Investment Record
What effect did the new structure have on MIT's shareholders? It
is not difficult to measure. For MIT was the prototypical mutual fund,
widely diversified among about 100 blue-chip stocks and, unsurpris-
ingly, providing returns that closely paralleled those of the Standard &
Poor's 500 Stock Index") (lhe "Index" or "S&P 500"), with an average
correlation (Re) of 0.94 that has remained remarkably steady over its
entire eighty-year history. Given the tautology that the gross return of
the stock market, minus the costs of financial intermediation, equals
the net return earned by market participants, it would be surprising if
the rising costs that followed MIT's demutualization were not accom-
panied by deterioration in the returns enjoyed by its shareowners.
Figure 3 11
No surprise, then. The Trust's relative returns declined. During
its mutual era (1926-1969), the Trust's average annual return of 8.4%
10 This was a ninety-stock index until 1957.
11 Sources: Wiesenberger (MIT return from 1926-1992), Lipper (MIT return from
1993-2003), Standard & Poor's (S&P 500 return). From 1993 on, reported MIT return
represents the asset-weighted average of all NI rr share classes.
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lagged the Index return of 9.7% by 1.3% per year." But after demu-
tualization (1969-2003), its average annual return of 9.7% lagged the
Index return of 11.3% by 1,6% per year—a 0.3% reduction in relative
return that. exactly matches the increase in its average expense ratio
from 0.3% in the 1925-1969 period to 0.6% in 1969-2003."
This increase in the shortfall in M1T's annual returns during the
Trust's thirty-four-year Omega period may seem trivial. But it is not.
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Figure 4 14
Thanks to the miracle of compounding 'returns, each $1 initially invested
in the S&P 500 at the end of 1969 would have been valued at $38 at the
end of 2003. Confronted by the tyranny of compounding costs over that
long period, however, each $1 invested in MIT would have had a final
value of just. $23.60—in relative terms, a 38% loss of principal.
12
 Because the Index return ignores the real world costs of investing, of course, that
shortfall may not be surprising.
13
 The ratio had risen to an estimated 1.2% in 2003, suggesting a much wider lag in
the years ahead.
" Sources: see supra note 11.
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II. THE WELLINGTON GROUP
Even as MIT was abandoning its Alpha mutual structure in favor of
an externally managed Omega structure in 1969, the stage was being
set for another firm to take precisely the opposite action. Philadelphia's
Wellington Group ("Wellington" or "Wellington Group")—eleven asso-
ciated mutual funds with assets of some $2.4 billion (more than $1 bil-
lion behind the then-combined total of $3.5 billion for MIT and its sis-
ter growth fund)—was operated by Wellington Management Company
("Wellington Management"), then largely owned by its executives but
with public shareholders as well. Its stock had recently sold at an all-
time high of $50 per share, nearly three times its initial public offering
price of $18 in 1960. Despite the travail that followed the demise of the
go-go years, the stock market was again rallying, on the way to its then
all-time high early in 1973, and the company was prospering.
With the so-called "currency" that its public stock had made avail-
able, Wellington Management had merged with the Boston investment
counsel firm of Thorndike, Doran, Paine and Lewis, Inc. ("TDP&L"),
in 1967. TDP&L was also the manager of Ivest Fund, a "go-go" fund
that was one of the industry's premier performers during that era of
speculation, and it soon became a major generator of the Wellington
Group's capital inflows. And yet, even as MIT had just gone in the op-
posite direction, the Wellington CEO (who was also the Chairman and
President of Wellington funds)n5 was pondering whether this Omega
structure was the optimal one for the funds' shareholders, and whether
a change to the recently vanished Alpha structure would improve both
the lot of its fund shareholders as well as the firm's competitive position
in the industry.
In September 1971, he went public with his concerns. Speaking
at the annual meeting of the firm's partners, he talked about the pos-
sibility of nnualization, including in his remarks a 1934 quotation
from Justice Harlan Fiske Stone:
" [M]ost of the mistakes and ... major faults of the recent
financial era] will be ascribed to the failure to observe the
fiduciary principle, the precept as old as holy writ, that 'a
man cannot serve two masters' .... [T] hose who serve
nominally as trustees, but ... consider only last the interests
15 It was I who served in these positions, but I feel more comfortable using the third
person format. This combination of seemingly conflicting roles was then, and remains
now, the industry norm.
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of those whose funds they command, suggest how far we
have ignored the necessary implications of that principle.'"
The Wellington CEO endorsed that point of view, and revealed what
he described as
an ancient prejudice of mine: All things considered, . . . it is
undesirable for professional entetprises to have public stockhold-
ers... , Indeed, it is possible to envision circumstances in
which the pressure for earnings and earnings growth engen-
dered by public ownership is antithetical to the responsible
operation of a professional organization. Although the field
of money management has elements of both, differences be-
tween a business and a profession must, finally, be reconciled
in favor of the client."
He then tranced on some ideas about how such a reconciliation
might be achieved: (1) "`mutualization' whereby the funds acquire the
management company"; (2) "'internalization' whereby the active ex-
ecutives own the management company, with contracts that are negoti-
ated on some type of 'cost-plus' basis, providing incentives for both per-
formance and efficiency, but without the ability to capitalize earnings
through public sale"; and (3) limited internalization, with funds "made
self-sustaining with respect to administration and distribution," but with
external investment mangers.la
A. From Omega to Alpha
Within three years, the CEO was put in a position in which he
would not only talk the talk about muntalization, but would walk the
walk. Even before the 1973-1974 bear market began, Wellington's
business had begun to deteriorate and the cash inflows of the Welling-
ton funds, $280 million in 1967, had by 1973 turned to cash outflows of
$300 million. The speculative funds created by the firm were suffering
serious capital erosion and most would be merged out of existence be-
fore the decade was out. Assets of the conservative Wellington Fund
(the "Fund") flagship had tumbled from $2 billion in 1965 to less than
t6 JOHN C. BOGIE, 3011N BOGIE ON INVESTING 256 (2001) (quoting Harlan F. Stone,
The Public Influence of the Bo); 48 HAIM L. ItEv. 1, 8-9 (1934)). The speech, entitled Deliver-
once, was given to the Wellington Management Company Partners in Boston, Massachu-
setts on September 9, 1971.
17 Id. (emphasis added).
15 Id. at 257-58.
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$1 billion, on the way to $480 million in 1980. Wellington Manage-
ment's earnings of $2.52 per share in 1968 had dropped to $1.14 in
1974 and the stock price had fallen to $9.75 per share, on its way to a
low of $4.87.
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This concatenation of dire events was enough to cause the happy
partnership formed by the 1967 merger to fall apart, and Wellington
Management Company's CEO got the axe on January 23, 1974. But
he remained as Chairman of the funds, with their largely separate
(and independent) hoard of directors.
Shortly before the firing, the handwriting was on the wall, as it
were, suggesting the nature of the change that might be in store. On
January 12, 1974, the CEO had submitted a proposal to the mutual
fund board of directors to mutualize the funds and operate iunder an
internally managed structure. He wrote:
I propose that the Wellington Group of mutual funds acquire
Wellington Management Company and its business assets ....
ID Source: Wiesenberger.
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... Wellington Management Company wottld become a
wholly-owned subsidiary of the several funds and would
serve as investment advisor and national distributor for them
on an "at cost" basis, resulting in estimated savings to the
funds of $2 to $3 million per year in management fees..
[T]he funds would pay an amount estimated to be in
the $6 million range [the adjusted market capitalization of
the company's stock] 2° . , and would receive in return liq-
uid and fixed assets approximating $4 million with the re-
maining $2 million representing payment for the "going .
concern" value [or goodwill] of the en terprise. 21
One need only understand the stunningly high profit margins of
the investment management business to imagine a less-than-one-
year(I) payback of the net acquisition cost. of $2 million. While Wel-
lington Management's stock price had tumbled, and its fee revenues
had declined, the firm's pre-tax profit margin nonetheless remained
at a healthy 33%22 Although the fund Chairman openly acknowl-
edged that such a conversion to mutual status was "unprecedented in
the mutual fund industry,"" the cautious fund board was interested
enough to ask hint to expand the scope of his proposal and undertake
"a 'comprehensive review of the best. means by which the Funds could
best obtain advisory, management. and administrative services at the
lowest reasonable cost to the shareholders of the Funds.'" 24 The board
also asked Wellington Management to produce a similar study.
By March 11, 1974, the Chairman's first report was completed."
Entitled "The Future Structure of the Wellington Group of Invest-
ment Companies," the report offered seven stnictural options, of
which the board decided to focus on these four:
2° Under the proposal, the Wellington Group would acquire only Wellington Man-
agement's mutual find business. Its counseling business would have been returned to the
pre-merger partners.
21
 John C. Bogle, Mutualizing 'Wellington Management Company 1-2 ( Jan. 12, 1974)
(on file with author).
22 Revenues were $9.6 million, expenses $6.4 million, and profits $3.2 million.
23 Bogle, supra note 21, at 1.
24 See Memorandum #3 from Richard B. Smith, Esq.. Oasis Polk & Wardwell, Special Coun-
sel, to the Independent Directors of Wellington Fund et al. 1 (Sept. 30, 1974) (quoting the
board's directive from their January 24, 1979 meeting) (on file with author).
23 John C. Bogle, The Future Structure of the Wellington Group of Investment Com-
panies, Part I (Mar. 11. 1974) (on file with author).
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1. Status Quo----the continuation of the existing relationships.
9. Internal Administration—administration by the funds them-
selves; distribution and investment advice from Wellington
Management.
3. Internal Administration and Distribution —with only invest-
ment advice from Wellington.
4. Mutualization—acquisition by the funds of all of Welling-
ton's fund-related activities.
The Future Structure study spelled out the ultimate objective:
independence. One of the goals was to give the funds "[a]n appropri-
ate amount of corporate, business and economic independence," 26
the Chairman wrote, noting that such a structure was clearly contem-
plated by the Investment Company Act. But such independence, his
study added, had proved to be an illusion in the industry, with "fund
structures [being] little more than corporate shells.... [with] no in-
dependent ability to conduct their own business affairs. ... This struc-
ture has been the accepted norm for the mutual fund industry for
[more than] fifty years." 27 He bluntly concluded:
The issue we face is whether a structure so traditional, so
long accepted, so satisfactory for an infant industry as it
grew, during a time of less stringent ethical and legal stan-
dards, is really the optimum structure for these times and for
the future .. Or, [whether], ... the Funds [should] seek
the greater control over their own destiny so clearly implied
by the word "independence." 28
Although the fund Chairman clearly preferred his original proposal of
mutualization, he was prepared to begin with less, concluding, the study
with these words: "Perhaps, then, the issue is not 'whether', but only
`when', the Wellington Group of Investment Companies will become
completely independent. "29
As it would soon turn out, he would have to be content with less
than full mutualization. After much study, even more contention, and
debate that sometimes seemed to be endless, the board made its deci-
sion on June 9, 1974. It chose the least disruptive option, number two,
establishing the funds' own administrative staff under the direction of
26 hi. at 1.
27 Id. at 7-8.
28 Id. at 8 (emphasis added).
2'2 Id. at 45 (emphasis added).
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its operating officers, who would also be responsible, as the board's
counsel, former Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC" or the
"Commission") Commissioner Richard B. Smith wrote, for "monitor-
ing and evaluating the external [investment advisory and distribu-
tion] services being provided" by Wellington Management." The de-
cision, the counselor added, "was not envisaged as a 'first step' to
internalize additional functions, but .. . to form a structure that will
hopefully last into the future." 31
B. Enter%) 'guard
Late in the stmuner, to the Chairman's amazement and disap-
pointment, the board agreed that. Wellington Management would retain
its name. Although Wellington Fund would also retain its name, a new
name would have to be found for the administrative company. In Sep-
tember, he proposed to call the new company "Vanguard" and, after
more contention, the board approved the name. The Vanguard Group,
Inc. ("Vanguard") was incorporated on September 24, 1974. Early in
1975, the SEC cleared, without apparent difficulty, the funds' proxy
statements proposing the change; the fund shareholders approved it;
and Vanguard, a wholly owned subsidiary of the funds operating on an
at-cost basis, began operations on May 1, 1975.
But no sooner than the ink was dry on the various agreements,
things began to change. With the funds controlling only one leg—
and, arguably, the least important. leg—of the Operations/investment
management/distribution tripod on which any fund complex rests,
the Chairman began to have second thoughts. As lie would later write:
It was a victory of sorts, hut, I feared, a Pyrrhic victory.
Why? Because success in the fund field is not driven by how
well the funds are administered. Though their affairs must be
supervised and controlled with dedication, skill, and preci-
sion, success is determined by what. kinds of funds are created,
by whether superior investment returns are attained, and by
how—and how effectively—the funds are marketed and dis-
tributed. We had been given one-third of the fund loaf, as it
were, but it was the least important third. It was the other two-
thirds that would make us or break us....
" Memorandum #2 from Richard B. Smith, Esq., Davis Polk & Wardwell. Special Counsel,
to the Independent Directors of Wellington Fund et al. 1 ( July 23, 1974) (on file with author).
31 Id. at 6 (emphasis added).
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... I had realized all along that the narrow mandate that
precluded our engaging in portfolio management and dis-
tribution services would give Vanguard insufficient power to
control its destiny.32
The next one-third of the loaf was seized quickly'. The newly
named Vanguard Group's entry into the investment management
arena came in a groundbreaking way: Only a few short months after
the firm began operations, the hoard of the funds approved the crea-
tion of an index fund, modeled on the S&P 500, It was incorporated
late in 1975. When its initial public offering was completed in August
1976, it had raised a disappointing $11 million. But the world's first
index mutual fund had come into existence. It is now the largest mu-
tual fund in the world,
Only five years after that halting entry into what was, arguably,
equity investment management, the firm assumed full responsibility
for the management of Vanguard's bond and money market funds. A
decade later, Vanguard began also to manage equity funds that relied
on quantitative techniques rather than fundamental analysis. A variety
of external advisers continue to manage Vanguard's actively managed
equity and balanced funds, now constituting some $180 billion of the
Group's $700 billion of assets."
C. Improved Returns in a Full-Fledged Alpha Complex
The final one-third of the mutual fund loaf was acquired only five
months after • the index fund IPO had brought investment manage-
ment under Vanguard's aegis. On February 9, 1977, yet another un-
precedented decision brought share distribution into the fold. After
another contentious debate in a politically charged environment, and
by the narrowest of margins, the fund board accepted the Chairman's
recommendation that the funds terminate their distribution agree-
ments with Wellington Management, eliminate all sales charges, and
abandon the broker-dealer distribution system that had distributed
Wellington shares for nearly a half century. Overnight, Vanguard had
eliminated its entire distribution system, and moved from the seller-
driven, load-fund channel to the buyer-driven, no-load channel. Nar-
32 JOHN C, BOGLE, CHARACIrElt CoUN1s 5, 6 (2002).
33
 Wellington Management continues to manage Wellington Fund, as it has through-
out the fund's now seventy-five year history.
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row as the mandate was, it set the fledgling organization on a new and
unprecedented course.
What would the flourishing of Vanguard into a full-fledged Alpha
complex—its full mutualization—mean to its fund investors? First, it
would mean far lower fund operating expenses, with the group's
weighted expense ratio tumbling from an average of 0.67% in 1975 to
0.26% in 2002—a reduction of more than 60%. Second, it would mean
that the earlier 8.5% front-end load—and the performance drag on
shareholder returns inevitably entailed by that initial sales charge—
would be removed forever. And because gross returns in the financial
markets, minus costs, equal the net. returns earned by investors, this
slashing of costs was virtually certain to enhance shareholder returns.
And that is just what Vanguard's change from Omega to Alpha
did. What followed over the subsequent twenty-nine years was a major
enhancement in the absolute returns (sheer good luck!) and the rela-
tive returns earned by Wellington Fund.
Figure 634
94
 Source: Bogle Financial Markets Research Center. Benchmark return for 1945-1975
represents 35% of Ibbotson's return for intermediate term government bonds plus 65% of
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Specifically, this balanced fund provided an annual return of 12.9%
from 1974-2003, actually outpacing the 12.3% annual return of its
unmanaged (and cost-free) benchmark-35% Lehman Aggregate
Bond Index, 65% S&P 500, an allocation comparable to Welling-
ton's—and by an even wider margin the 11.1% rate of return earned
by the average balanced fund. During the comparable prior period
(1945-1974) under the Omega structure, the Fund's return of just
5.7% had actually lagged the benchmark return of 7.6% by a full 1.9
percentage points per year.
Part of that near-miraculous 2.5 percentage point annual im-
provement in relative returns—a staggering margin—was related to
lower costs. The Fund's expense ratio, low enough in the earlier pe-
riod at 0.56%, fell nearly 40% to 0.34%, and the sales charge drag was
eliminated.
Figure 735
But the largest part of the improvement arose from a 1978 change in
the Fund's investment strategy, in which the Fund's management di-
the S&P 500 return. From 1976-2003, the Lehman Aggregate Bond index made up the
35% bond benchmark component in place of the Ibbotson figure.
35 Source: see sopra note 34.
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rected its reluctant adviser to return to its traditional conservative, in-
come-oriented policies from which it had strayed during the late 1960s
and 1970s. Result: by the end of 2003, each $1 invested in Wellington
Fund in 1974 would have grown to $33.60. The same investment in the
balanced index benchmark, in comparison, would have grown to just
$28.90. 36 The lower chart, showing the relative cumulative returns of
Wellington Fund vis-a-vis its benchmark, presents a stunning contrast
with the lower chart on Figure 4. 37
Other than the direct impact of costs, it is not. easy to characterize
"cause and effect" in the attribution of investment performance. Al-
though Wellington Fund's return to its conservative investment tradi-
tion was a major benefit, the new Alpha structure itself, under which
Wellington Management became an external investment adviser that
had to provide satisfactory performance in order to retain its inde-
pendent. client, could well have itself provided a major benefit.. And,
although we cannot be certain, the development of the arms-length
relationship that is part of the Alpha model clearly did no harm.
III. ALPHA VS. OMEGA: LOWER COSTS AND HIGHER MARKET SHARE
Whatever the case, we do know that there is a powerful and per-
vasive relationship between expense ratios and fund net returns. We
know, for example, that the correlation coefficient of the ten-year re-
turns of individual equity funds and their costs is a remarkably im-
pressive negative 0.60. We also know that during each of the past two
decades the returns of the equity funds in the low-cost quartile have
consistently outpaced the returns of funds in the high-cost quartile by
an enormous margin of some 2.5% per year. The lower the cost, the
higher the return. And it is crystal clear that. the Alpha model of fund
operations is, well, cheap, whereas the Omega model is dear.
The contrast in costs could hardly be sharper than in the two
fund complexes we have just considered. Both were dominated by a
single mutual fund until the 1960s before becoming more and more
diversified fund complexes thereafter. Both had roughly comparable
assets under management up until the 1980s—in the hundreds of mil-
lions in the 1950s, then the billions in the 1960s and 1970s, growing
to the tens of billions in the 1980s. Then their paths diverged. While
Massachusetts Financial Services enjoyed solid asset growth to some
" A similar investment in the average balanced fund would have grown to just
$20.96—about 40% below Wellington's value.
97 See supra note 14, accompanying figure, and adjacent text.
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$94 billion at the market's peak in 2000, Vanguard grew even faster,
then overseeing some $560 billion of assets.
Late in their Alpha period, the asset-weighted expense ratio of the
MFS funds averaged less than 0.25%. Under its new Omega model, the
MFS ratio jumped to 0.67% in 1984, to 0.92% in 1988, to 1.20% in
1993, and to 1.25% in 2002, an increase of 421% for the full period.
Alpha and Omega:
Vanguard and MFS Expense Ratios
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Figure 838
By way of contrast, late in their Omega period the Vanguard funds'
ratio averaged about 0.60%. Under its new Alpha structure, the Van-
guard ratio tumbled to 0.54% in 1984, to 0.40% in 1988, and to 0.30%
in 1993, continuing to drop in 2002 to just 0.26%, a reduction of 61%
from the pre-Alpha rate.
These ratios may seem diminutive and trivial but they are not.
They entail hundreds of millions, even billions, of dollars. In 2003,
the assets of the Omega MFS funds totaled $78 billion, and their
1.25% expense ratios, including management fees, 1213-1 fees, and
operating costs, produced expenses totaling $975 million. Had their
3a Sources: University of Chicago's CRSP database ("CRSP") (for MFS data) and The
Vanguard Group (for Vanguard data). All expense ratios are asset weighted by year-end
fund assets.
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earlier 0.25% ratio prevailed, those costs would have been just $195
million, an astonishing $780 million(I) saving.
The Manifestation of the Alpha Benefit
	MFS	 Vanguard
2003 Assets	 $78 B	 $667 B
Omega Exp. Ratio 	 1.25%	 0.60%
Fees Generated	 $975 M	 $4,000 M
Alpha Exp. Ratio	 0.25%
	 0.26%
Fees Generated	 $195 M	 $1,700 M
Savings Under	 $780 M	 $2,300 M
Alpha Structure	 (projected)	 (actual)
Figure 939
Again by way of contrast, assets of the Alpha Vanguard funds to-
taled $667 billion in 2003; with expenses of $1.7 billion, the expense
ratio was 0.26%. Had the earlier 0.60% ratio under its Omega struc-
ture prevailed, Vanguard's expenses would otherwise have been $4.0
billion, representing $2.3 billion of additional costs that would have
been incurred by its fund shareholders.
Even as Vanguard, under its Alpha structure, did good in building
value for its fund shareholders, it did well in implementing its business
strategy. Assets under management have grown from $1,4 billion in
1974 to nearly $700 billion currently and its share of mutual fund in-
dustry assets has soared. Although a late entry into the money market
business resulted in a plunge in its market share from 3.5% in 1974 to
1.7% in 1981, the rise since then has been unremitting, consistent,
and powerful.
" Sources: Wiesenberger (MFS Alpha period expense ratio), Lipper (NIFS 2003 assets
and expense data), and The Vanguard Group (Vanguard data). The NIFS Alpha period
expense ratio is the average of the expense ratios from 1943-1969.
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Figure 104°
As 2004 begins, Vanguard's share of industry assets stands at 9.2%—by
far the largest market share increase achieved by any mutual fund firm.
The growth of MFS assets, too, has been awesome—from $3.3 bil-
lion in 1969, when it abandoned its original Alpha structure, to $78
billion currently. But its original 7.0% market share began to shrink
within a few years after the change, falling to just 1.1% in 1982, where
it remains today. To the extent that we can measure it, then, under
the Omega strategy—which is of course the strategy that is pervasive
in the industry—the MFS transition from its original roots has not
only resulted in increased costs and reduced returns for its fund
shareholders, but proved to be a losing strategy in the highly competi-
tive mutual fund marketplace.
Nonetheless, the Omega strategy does have something very im-
portant going for it: it is immensely profitable for Me funds' managers. Im-
mediately after its demutualization in 1969, MFS remained a private
company, with its profits divided among its own executives and em-
-40 Sources: CRSP (industry total net assets from 1961-1968 and NIFS total net assets),
the Investment Company Institute (industry total net assets from 1969-2003), and The Van-
guard Group (Vanguard total net assets).
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ployees. But in 1981, in a curious twist, the firm sold itself to Sun Life
of Canada ("Sun Life"), which remains its owner today. 41 According to
Sun Life's financial statements, the pre-tax earnings of MFS during
the five year period 1998-2002 totaled roughly $1,900,000,000 (Cana-
dian), certainly a splendid return on their initial (but undisclosed)
capital investment—a near $2 billion (Canadian) gold mine for the
Sun Life shareholders.42
A. Tested in the Crucible
Both the Alpha fund model and the Omega fund model have
been tested over almost. the entire eighty-year history of the industr): 43
The forty-five-year preeminence that MIT achieved from 1924 to
1969, to say nothing of the flourishing of Vanguard almost from the
day it was created, hardly suggests major flaws in the Alpha model. Yet
the economics of the business remain a major stumbling block to the
creation of new Alpha organizations. If funds are run at cost, after all,
there are no profits for the management company owners. It is hardly
surprising, then, that Vanguard's structure has yet to be copied, or
even imitated.
It is a curious paradox that the transformation of MFS from the
Alpha model to the Omega model was accomplished with apparent.
ease. Vanguard's conversion from Omega to Alpha, however, was
fraught not only with contention and debate, but, with regulatory op-
position. Whereas the internalization of the administration of the Wel-
lington funds was straightforward, and even the internalization of the
management of the index fund raised no regulatory eyebrows, the de-
cision to internalize distribution was a bombshell. It was opposed by a
Wellington Fund shareholder, who called for—and received—a formal
SEC administrative hearing, which was said to be the longest hearing
hi the history of the Investment Company Act, lasting, if memory
serves, something like ten full days in court, and a long period of ex-
amination by the regulators. Finally, in July 1978, after considering our
application for the Vanguard funds to assume joint financial and ad-
ministrative responsibility for the promotion and distribution of our
MFS executives now hold about 8% of its stock.
42 See StIll Life of Canada's financial statements and annual reports for the years
1998-2002, which are available online at littp://www.stinlife.com/slcorp/genericpage/O,
3324,bGFuZy 1 ibmcisaXNoX3NpdGU tc2xjb3JwX2Vud saXZ1X3136bil nZ11'5lcinljX3NITOx
OF9zdGFOLV91ZC1fhinF2LTNIzMz10,00.hunl (last visited March 24, 2004).
43 1970-1974 was the only period during which no Alpha model existed.
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shares, the administrative law judge who presided at the hearing made
his decision: Rejection! 44 We were back to square one.
At issue was a long history during which the SEC had successfully
argued that funds could not spend their own assets on distribution. 45
Shortly after we made the no-load decision in February 1977, we had
asked for an exemption that would allow the funds to spend a limited
amount (a maximum of 0.20% of net assets) on distribution. Al-
though our argument in favor of this plan was somewhat technical, it
came down to the fact that, while we would spend $1.3 million on dis-
tribution, we would simultaneously slash by $2.1 million the annual
advisory fees paid to Wellington Management for that purpose: As-
suming responsibility for distribution would result, not in a cost to the
funds' shareholders, but. in a net savings of $800,000 per year.
Happily, the SEC had allowed us temporarily to pursue our dis-
tribution plan pending Commission and fund shareholder approval.
So Vanguard had in fact been running the distribution system since
1977. Despite his rejection of our plan, the judge gave us the oppor-
tunity to amend it, and after making a few technical changes, we re-
submitted it early in 1980. With this sword of Damocles suspended
above us during this long period, we blithely pursued our distribution
activities. The threatening sword was finally removed on February 25,
1981, when the Commission at last rendered its decision. 46
The decision was a home run for Vanguard! Far better than any
characterization I could use to describe the decision, the Commis-
sion's words speak for themselves:
Applicants' joint distribution arrangement is consistent
with the provisions, policies and purposes of the Act. The
proposed plan actually furthers the Act's objectives by ensur-
ing that the Funds' directors, with more specific information
at their disposal concerning the cost and performance of
each service rendered to the Funds, are better able to evalu-
ate the quality of those services. Moreover, applicants' pro-
posal will foster improved disclosure to shareholders, ena-
bling them to make a more informed judgment as to the
Funds' operations. In addition, the plan clearly enhances the
44 See The Vanguard Group, Inc., 47 S.E.C. 450, 451 (1981).
" Clearly all major fund complexes were making such expenditures, but it was argued
successfully, if problematically, that the managers were paying the distribution costs out of
their own profits.
98 Vanguard, 47 S.E.C. at 450.
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Funds' independence, permitting them to change invest-
ment advisers more readily as conditions may dictate.
The proposed plan also benefits each fund within a rea-
sonable range of fairness. Specifically, the plan promotes a
healthy and viable mutual fund complex within which each
fund can better prosper; enables the Funds to realize sub-
stantial savings from advisory fee reductions; promotes sav-
ings from economies of scale; and provides the Funds with
direct and conflict-free control over distribution functions.
Accordingly, we deem it appropriate to grant the applica-
tion before us ... . 47
The decision was unanimous. We had at last formally completed our
move from the original Omega model under which we had operated
for nearly a half century, to a full-fledged Alpha mutual fund model.
Our joy was profound and unrestrained, and our optimism about the
future was boundless.
B. An Elementary Principle, Too Often Ignored
The Commission's decision, in its own blunt words, was based on
loJne of the Act's basic policies ... that funds should he managed
and operated in the best interests of their shareholders, rather than in
the interests of advisers, underwriters or others." 48 And that would
also seem to be the most elementary principle of the common law as
it relates to fiduciary duty and trusteeship. 49 Yet. it must have been ob-
vious to the Commissioners that, although they had just approved our
Alpha model, the entire rest of the industry was operating under an
Omega model in which the advisers and underwriters—the funds'
management companies—were in the driver's seat.
Fully fifteen years earlier, in fact, the SEC had vigorously recom-
mended legislative changes designed to restore a better balance of
interest between shareholders and managers. In Public Policy Itnplica-
lions of In vestment Company Growth, a report. to the i-louse Committee
on Interstate and Foreign Commerce dated December 2, 1966, the
47 Id. at 470.
48
 Id. at 456.
49 Sec RESTATEMENT (THIRD) or TRUSTS § 2 crnt. b (2003) ("Despite the differences in
the legal circumstances and responsibilities of various fiduciaries, one characteristic is
common to all: a person in a fiduciary relationship to another is under a duty to act for
the benefit of the other as to matters within the scope of the relationship.").
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Commission pointedly noted that "internally managed companies,
which employed their own advisory staffs, had significantly lower
management costs than the externally managed funds, whose invest-
ment advisers were compensated by fees based, in most cases, on a
fixed percentage of the fund's net assets."5°
After considering the level of fund fees ($130 million a year
seemed large in 1966, but by 2003 fees had soared to $32 billion); the
far lower fee rates paid by pension plans and internally managed
funds; the then-average 48% (I) pre-tax profit margin earned by pub-
licly held management companies; and the effective control advisers
held over their funds, as well as "[t]he absence of competitive pres-
sures, the limitations of disclosure, the ineffectiveness of shareholder
voting rights, and the obstacles to more effective action by the unaf-
filiated directors,"51 the SEC recommended the adoption of a "statu-
tory standard of reasonableness. "5 2
The Commission described this standard as a "basic fiduciary stan-
dard [that] would make clear that those who derive benefits from their
fiduciary relationships with investment companies cannot charge them
more for services than if they were dealing with them on an arm's-
length basis?" The SEC described reasonableness as "a clearly ex-
pressed and readily enforceable standard that would measure the fair-
ness of compensation paid by investment companies for services fur-
nished by those who occupy a fiduciary relationship" 54 to the mutual
funds they manage:
[This standard] would not be measured merely by the cost of
comparable services to individual investors or by the fees
charged to other externally managed investment compa-
nies.... [but by the] costs of management services to inter-
nally managed investment companies and costs of invest-
ment management services provided to pension and profit-
sharing plans and other large nonfund clients.. [and]
their benefit to the investment company and its shareholders
.... [including] sustained investment performance ...
5° H.R. REP. Nu, 89-2337, at 102 (1966).
51 Id. at 132.
52 Id. at 143.
53 Id. at 144.
54 Id. at 143.
2004]	 Re-Alutualizing the Mutual Fu lid Industry	 415
The Commission is not prepared to recommend at this
dine the more drastic statutory requirement of compulsory in-
ternalization of the management function of all investment
companies [and the performance of services at cost]....
While internalization could produce significant savings in
management costs for large investment companies ... , for
smaller ones it might be more costly.... [or] would be in-
sufficient to provide an adequate full-dine staff [and]
might prove a deterrent to the promotion of new investment
companies ... . 55
Accordingly, the Commission believed that, "au alternative to the more
drastic solution of compulsory internalization ... should be given a fair
trial."56 If the standard of reasonableness does not "resolve the prob-
lems that exist in the area of investment company management com-
pensation... . then more sweeping steps might deserve to lie considered."57
Alas, the Commission's "reasonableness" proposal was never put
to the test. The industry fought hard, and lobbied Congress vigor-
ously. Finally, five years later, in the Investment. Company Amend-
ments Act of 1970, the Commission had to settle for a weak provision
in which the investment adviser was charged with "a fiduciary duty
with respect to the receipt. of compensation for services," 58 with dam-
ages limited to the actual compensation received, and with no
definition of what might constitute reasonableness. 59
 And even thirty-
three years later, "more sweeping steps" have yet to be considered.°
In its 1966 report, the SEC had also expressed concerns about
the growing trend of sales of management companies to other firms
at prices far above book value, transfers the Commission opined have
"some elements of the sale of a fiduciary office [which is] strictly pro-
hibited al common law."61 It also expressed a concern about earlier
'widespread 'trafficking' in advisory and underwriting contracts:62
The Commission recommended that the sale of a management com-
pany could not take place if it came with "any express or implied un-
derstanding ... likely to impose additional burdens on the investment
66
 H.R. REP. No. 89-2337, at 145, 148--49 (emphasis added).
56 Id. at 149.
57 Id. (emphasis added).
"Investment Company Amendments Act of 1970 § 36(b), 15 U.S.C. § 803-35(b) (2000).
59 See id. § 36(b) (3), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-35 (b) (3).
69 See H.R. REP. No. 89-2337, at 149.
61 Id. at 151 (emphasis added).
62
 Id. at 150.
Where are the Economies of Scale?
1965 2003 Change
Total Equity Assets $26.3 B $3,361 B +128 x
Average Exp. Ratio 0.87% 1.62% +86%
Wtd. Exp. Ratio' 0.51% 0.95% +86%
Fees Generated' $134 M $31,900 M +238 x
.• Weighted by fund assets.
t Fees generated uses weighted overage.
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company."63 The implication that funds were already bearing heavy
burdens would have been lost on few observers, and even the subse-
quent legislation diluted that protection.
Had the initial SEC recommendations prevailed, they may well
have aborted the accelerating trend toward higher fund expense ra-
tios that today seems endemic in the fund industry. The unweighted
expense ratio of 0.87% for the average equity fund that concerned
the Commission in 1965 has risen by 86%, to 1.62%. 64
But we deceive ourselves when we look at fee rates instead of fee
dollars. When applied to the burgeoning assets of equity funds ($26.3
billion in 1965 and $3.36 trillion in 2003), equity fund expenses have
leaped from $134 million in 1965 to an estimated $31,9 billion in 2003.
Figure 1 1 65
63 Id. at 152 (emphasis added).
64 For those who think that asset-weighted expense ratios are a better test, the increase
was from 0.51% to 0.95%—the same 86% increase!
65 Sources: CRSP (1965 total net asset and expense ratios for all diversified stock and
specialty funds) and Lipper (2003 total net asset and expense ratios for all equity funds
except balanced, flexible, and real estate funds, and funds for which Lipper contains no ex-
pense ratio data).
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Fund expenses have risen 238 fold(!) since 1965, nearly double the
128-fold increase in equity fund assets. In a field in which, as today's
lone Alpha fund complex demonstrates, the economies of scale in fund
operations are truly staggering, it is a truly astonishing anomaly.
Further, the SEC's 1966 concern about trafficking in advisory
contracts could hardly have been more prescient. Although a number
of fund management firms had gone public with IPOs by then, the
large majority remained privately held. Today, only six(?) privately
held firms remain (seven if we include Vanguard) among the largest
fifty fund managers. Another seven are publicly held, and fully thirty-
six are owned by giant financial conglomerates. from Sun Life and
Marsh and McLennan, to Deutsche Bank and AXA, to Citigroup and
IP. Morgan. With these consummate business firms in control, it is
small wonder that the idea of fund management as a profession is
gradually receding. Using the words I used in my 1971 speech, these
firms are "the financial heirs of the [original mutual fund] entrepre-
neurs ... if it is a burden to [fund shareholders] to be served by a
public enterprise, should this burden exist in perpetuity? "66
Apparently, the burden should. For such trafficking takes place
with the tacit consent of fund directors, who seem all too willing to
ignore the burdens imposed on funds that are part of giant conglom-
erates—firms whose overriding goal is a return on their capital, even at
the expense of the returns on the fund shareholders' capital. When
such transfers are proposed, fund directors could easily insist on fee
reductions—or even mutualization—but they apparently have never
done so. In a recent sale (for $3.1 billion!) of a large fund manager to
Lehman Brothers, the earlier fee structure remained intact.° So far,
at least, the directors seem disinclined to act even when a scandal-
ridden firm is on the auction block (Strong Management) or is al-
ready part of a conglomerate (Putnam, which has delivered nearly $4
billion of pre-tax profits to Marsh and McLennan over the past five
years.) The idea that "the burdens of public ownership should exist in
perpetuity" has yet to be challenged.
66 BOGLE. supra note 16, at 256 (emphasis omitted).
67
 In this acquisition, approved October 31, 2003, Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. ac-
quired Neuberger Berman Inc. See Press Release, Lehman Brothers, Lehman Brothers and
Neuberger Berman Complete Strategic Combination (Oct. 31, 2003), available at http://
www.lehman.com/press/pdf/103103..LBNB.pdf.
418	 Boston College Law Review 	 [Vol. 45:391
IV. IT IS TISIE FOR CHANGE
It is time for change in the mutual fund industry. We need to
rebalance the scale on which the respective interests of fund managers
and fund shareholders are weighed. Despite the express language of
the 1940 Act that arguably calls for all of the weight to be on the side
of fund shareholders,°° it is the managers' side of the scale that is vir-
tually touching the ground. Even to get a preponderance of the weight
on the shareholders' side, we need Congress to mandate: (I) an inde-
pendent fund board chairman; (2) no more than a single manage-
ment company director; (3) a fund staff or independent consultant
that provides objective information to the board; and (4) a federal
standard that, using the 1940 Act's present formulation, provides that
directors have a fiduciary duty to assure that "[funds] are organized, oper-
ated, [and] managed ... in the interest of [their] securities holders"
rather than in the interests of their "advisers [and] distributors."°°
As I wrote five years ago, changes such as these would at long last
allow independent directors to:
become ferocious advocates for the rights and interests of
the mutual fund shareholders they represent.... [T]hey
would negotiate aggressively with the mutual fund adviser
They would demand performance-related fees that en-
rich managers only as fund investors are themselves en-
riched .... They would challenge the use of 12b-1 distribu-
tion fees.... [Mild would no longer rubber-stamp gimmick
funds that have been cooked up by marketing executives
.... [They] would become the fiduciaries they are supposed
to be under the law .. . . 7°
Alternatively, and perhaps even more desirably, I argued, the industry
may require
[a] radical restructuring [which] would be the mutualization
of at least part of the American mutual fund industry.
Funds—or at least large fund families—would run them-
selves.... [A]nd the huge profits now earned by external
68 Investment Company Act of 1940 § 1 (b), (b) (2), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-1 (b), (b) (2) (2000)
(stating the national public interest and the interest of investors are adversely affected
when investment companies are organized, operated, managed ... in the interest of directors,
officers ... rather than in the interest of all classes of such companies' security holders").
68 Sec id. The italicized language would be added to the statute.
70 Jour.; C. BOGLE, CONINION SENSE ON MUTUAL FUNDS 395-96 (1999).
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managers would be diverted to the shareholders. They
wouldn't waste money on costly marketing campaigns de-
signed to bring in new investors at the expense of existing in-
vestors. With lower costs, they would produce higher returns
and/or assume lower risks....
[But] Megardless of the exact structure, mutual or conven-
tional, an arrangement in which fund shareholders and their
directors are in working control of a fund ... will lead to ....
[an] industry [that] will enhance economic value for fund
shareholders:7 i
And it is in that direction that this industry must at last move.
A, How to Get from Omega to Alpha
During its forty-five years of existence, the Alpha operating
model instituted by MIT eighty years ago worked well for its share-
holders. 72 Similarly, during Vanguard's soon-to-be thirty years of exis-
tence, our Alpha model has resulted in amazingly low costs for share-
holders, and generally superior returns compared to peer funds, to
say nothing of a spectacular (and unmatched) record of asset growth
and enhanced market share. 73 As an illustration of a demonstrably
winning strategy for fund shareholders, our Alpha model has met the
test of time.
Of course, we have enjoyed an advantage some of our rivals have
described as "unfair," Because the fund shareholders own Vanguard—
lock, stock, and barrel—none of their investment returns have had to
be diverted to the owners of a management company—private, pub-
lic, or financial conglomerate, whatever the case may be. Pitt another
way, our structure has been an essential element in the returns that
our shareholders have enjoyed. That shouldn't surprise anyone, for as
the economist Peter Bernstein has observed, "what happens to the
wealth of individual investors cannot be separated from the structure
of the industry that manages those assets." 74
With MIT long since having abandoned the Alpha model, Van-
guard alone has remained to test it. With this single exception, it is
the Omega model that prevails. But I simply cannot accept that today's
7 t
72 See supra Part I.A.
73 See supra Part II.C.
74 See Borax, supra note 70, at 'iii.
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model can be; as the word "Omega" suggests, the final stage of the 'nutria'
fund industry's development. That this model has ill-served fund inves-
tors could hardly be more obvious. This industry's present high level
of operating and transaction costs have led—as they must—to a lag in
the returns of the average equity fund of some three percentage
points per year behind the stock market itself over the past two dec-
ades, with similar cost-related lags for the industry's bond funds and
money market funds. And our focus on asset-gathering and marketing
has helped to create an even larger lag for the average equity fund
shareholder—at least another six or eight percentage points behind
the returns of the stock market itself, there for the taking.
I have no illusions that a return of the industry to its original Al-
pha model will be easy—not in the face of the powerful forces that are
entrenched in this industry and whose economic interests are at stake.
But I believe that this is the direction in which shareholders, competi-
tion, regulation, and legislation will move. Although we won't get all
the way to that goal in my lifetime, and maybe not even in the life-
times of most readers of this Essay, I'm certain that investors will not
ignore their own economic interests forever:
However, if Congress acts to impose on fund directors the re-
sponsibilities that so many of us believe they have always held but
rarely exercised, I see no reason that full mutualization should be
mandated by law. On the one hand, as long as advisory firms are
owned by managers who act responsibly and put the interests of their
fund shareholders first, and who make manifest their dedication to
that proposition in their actions—self-imposed limits on fees and on
marketing activities, focus on long-term investment strategies, and
superior service to their shareholders—mutualization hardly need be
required. On the other hand, when a fund complex reaches a certain
size or age—when it has become more business than profession—it is
high time to demand that mutualization—the Alpha model—be
placed on the board agenda, and be honestly and objectively consid-
ered. It won't be clone easily, of course, and literally no one in this in-
dustry knows as well as I do the obstacles that may be faced in reach-
ing that goal. But if there is a will, there will be a way.
CONCLUSION: STRUCTURE, STRATEGY, AND SPIRIT
Yet please understand me: although the Omega structure has
caused many of the mutual fund industry's serious shortcomings in
serving our shareholders, the Alpha structure is hardly a panacea that
will cure them. For a mutualization strudtire in which the interests of
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fund shareholders are placed front and center is, in and of itself, not
enough. Without the proper strategy, such a structure will lead no-
where. In the ideal, the strategy of nuttualization would emphasize low
operating costs and more, well, Spartan operations, a minimization of
the dead weight of marketing costs, and investment policies for stock,
bond, and money market funds alike that focus on the wisdom of long-
term investing rather than on the folly of short-term speculation.
Strategy, alas, does not. necessarily follow structure. One need
only look at the life insurance field to see how its sensible mutual
structure, finally, came to fail. With their heavy emphasis on sales and
their apparent lack of concern about costs, nearly all of the giant mu-
tual life insurance companies relinquished the strategy of service to
policyholders long before they abandoned their original Alpha struc-
ture. Partly as a result, this dominant industry of a half century ago has
lost much of its earlier appeal to American families.
But even more than structure and strategy to get today's Omega mu-
tual fund industry back to its Alpha origins, we need the spin./ of mutu-
ality—a spirit of trusteeship, a spirit of fiduciary duty, an all-
encompassing spirit of stervaidship—a spirit of service to the ninety mil-
lion shareholders who have entrusted the mutual fund industry with
their hard-earned dollars. As the recent scandals show, we need regula-
tion to curb our avarice. As our record since the publication of the
SEC's 1966 report has made clear, we need legislation to improve our
governance structure, a major step towards the ideal Alpha structure
whose development I have described in this Essay. But no regulation,
no legislation, can mandate a spirit of trusting and being trusted. Trust.
lutist come from within the character of the organization—whether
Omega or Alpha—and those firms that evince the spirit of t - rust. will
ultimately dominate the mutual fund field. Our industry's future de-
pends on the simple recognition that the management of other peo-
ple's money is a loyal duty and a solemn trust.
